The admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings in England and Wales is now governed 
Introduction
The Law Commission's report, Evidence in Criminal Proceedings: Hearsay and Related Topics 
The Law Commission's Recommendations
The Law Commission proposed that admissions and confessions would fall within one of three categories of automatically admissible hearsay evidence 2 , the rationale for the automatic admissibility of confessions being: "…the general assumption that what a person says against his or her own interests is likely to be true".
3 Admissibility would, however, be "subject to the existing statutory safeguards." 4 Thus, the Law Commission, having initially proposed in its consultation paper that, "… confessions should continue to be admissible against their makers, subject to section 76 of PACE and the discretions at common law and under section 78(1) of PACE to exclude prosecution evidence" "…the admissibility of a confession by one co-accused at the instance of another should be governed by provisions similar to section 76 of PACE, but taking into account the standard of proof applicable to a defendant." 8 In relation to the operation of this provision, the Law Commission indicated that:
Where a confession is admitted against one accused on behalf of a co-accused, the factfinders may consider the admission as exonerating the defendant who did not make it, but may not take it as evidence against the defendant who made it. A hearsay admission is still evidence only against the person who made it, and a jury must be warned accordingly. A number of our respondents thought it extremely important that this principle be retained, and we agree.
The first sentence of this quotation demonstrates that the Law Commission envisaged that where a confession made by a defendant is admitted for a co-defendant under s.76A the confession would not be evidence against its maker. Thus, Durston's reading of the Law Commission's proposals was that:
"…the Law Commission was adamant that, where a confession was admitted on behalf of a co-accused, but not the Crown, the tribunal of fact should only consider the admission as exonerating the co-defendant and not as evidence against its maker." 10 The second and third sentences of the above quotation from the Law Commission's Report indicate that the Law Commission intended to preserve "…the universal rule which excludes out of court admissions being used to provide evidence against a co-accused, whether indicted jointly or separately…". 11 Whilst these sentences appear under the heading "Confessions and co-defendants", they suggest that the Law Commission's intention was to preserve this rule as a rule that applied to confessions in general, whether adduced by a co-defendant or by the Crown. As is demonstrated immediately below, however, it seems that the Law Commission did not intend the operation of this rule to preclude the possibility that a confession made by a third party to criminal proceedings could So far as confessions made by persons who are not defendants in the proceedings (i.e. confessions made by third parties) are concerned, the Law Commission recognised that the existing position was that "A confession by someone who is not a defendant in the proceedings is inadmissible hearsay, consider a variety of specific factors when it is considering the admissibility of hearsay evidence under s.114(1)(d)) plus any other relevant factors), two relevant factors will be "the fact that the hearsay in question is an accusation against the defendant, rather than an admission against interest" and "the fact that it is the Crown which seeks to adduce it". 24 In relation to the former factor, their Lordships recognised that whilst a person will not normally confess to a crime that the person did not commit, a person may well have a motive to make a false allegation against another. 25 As regards the latter factor, their Lordships indicated that: "It does not necessarily follow that the interests of justice will point in the same direction upon an application by the Crown as they might upon an application made by a defendant". Whatever might be the situation if an erstwhile co-accused were to be unavailable or had demonstrably good reason not to give evidence, it will, as it seems to us, often not be in the interests of justice for evidence which the giver is not prepared to have tested to be put untested before the jury. Riat was concerned with the problems associated with admitting the hearsay evidence of an absent witness whereas when hearsay evidence is admitted under s.119 it will be the inconsistent statements of a witness who has been called and is, thus, available for cross-examination. The existence of s.119 must, however, be indirectly relevant in the context of the Riat process since, as has already been seen, the possibility of calling the third party whose confession implicates the accused and, where appropriate, relying upon the confession as evidence of the matters stated under s.119 is a matter that may be of relevance when the court is making an admissibility decision under s.114(1)(d).
Examination of the authorities concerning the admissibility of confessions made by third parties confirms that the approach of the Court of Appeal in those cases both equates with the Law Commission's intention that confessions made by third parties may potentially be admissible under the hearsay exceptions created by the 2003 Act and with the Law Commission's intention that recourse would only be had to its "safety valve" inclusionary discretion in exceptional circumstances.
A matter than was not considered in any of these cases (because the existence of the concept of the "non-hearsay confession"
had not yet been recognised by the courts) is whether a non-hearsay confession made by a third party is admissible in criminal proceedings as evidence against persons other than its maker. Whether this is so is considered in the final section of this article.
The admissibility of confessions made by defendants under the hearsay provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003
Since it came into force, the admissibility for the prosecution of confessions made by defendants has been governed by s. s.118(1) 5 applies in those circumstances in which the admissibility of confessions is still governed by the common law. 44 Conversely, it is possible to support the explanation of s.118(1) 5 in the explanatory notes as preserving ss.76(1) and 76A(1) on the basis that whilst the side note refers to "common law categories of admissibility", the words of s.118(1) itself merely refer to the preservation of "rules of law". Headings or side notes to sections (like explanatory notes themselves) are admissible as aids to construction but are not debated in Parliament and should be given less weight than the parts of an Act that are debated in Parliament. 45 In practice, provided that it is accepted that the regime in the 1984 Act which regulates the admissibility of confessions made by defendants has been preserved by clear, s.121 does not itself amount to a hearsay exception but, rather, imposes an "additional requirement" that must be satisfied if multiple hearsay is to be admitted. Consequently, in order for the confessions that Thakrar concerned to be admissible, it was necessary, in addition to satisfying the requirements of s.121 itself, both to identify a hearsay exception which was applicable to the accused's confessions and to identify a hearsay exception which was applicable to the statements made by the absent witnesses which were relied upon to prove the confessions. 67 The hearsay 
The admissibility of non-hearsay confessions
Traditionally confessions have been regarded as a form of hearsay evidence admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. As Lord Steyn put it in R v Hayter
:
A voluntary out of court confession or admission against interest made by a defendant is an exception to the hearsay rule and is admissible against him. That was so under the common law. That is also the effect of s 76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE).
As was seen above, the Law Commission intended that ("subject to the existing statutory safeguards") confessions would continue to fall within an "automatic admissibility" category of hearsay evidence. 78 Indeed, nothing in the Law Commission's Report suggests that it envisaged that its proposed reforms to the hearsay result would result in the possibility that some confessions would no longer amount to hearsay statements.
It has now become clear that, unlike the previous common law regime, the statutory hearsay …where the person from whose conduct a fact is to be inferred can safely be assumed to have believed that fact to be true -we do not think a court should be precluded from inferring that fact merely because that person may have been mistaken in believing it.
93
Applying this reasoning to non-hearsay confessions, the justification for removing them from the ambit of the hearsay rule would be that since the person who made the confession did not make it for the purpose of making anyone else believe the matter stated the risk that it was fabricated can be discounted. Indeed Upon the assumption that s.115(3) does prevail over the common law rule that confessions are only admissible against their makers in the context of non-hearsay confessions, the result so far as nonhearsay confessions made by defendants are concerned seems to be that provided that such a confession is not excluded by virtue of the operation of s.76(2) of the 1984 Act and assuming that the courts adopts the intermediate interpretation of s.128(2) which was suggested above, the confession, subject to the common law test of relevance (and to the exercise of exclusionary discretion if they were tendered by the prosecution) will be admissible not only against its maker but also against other co-defendants implicated thereby. If Spencer's narrower interpretation of s.128(2) is adopted, the confession could be admitted against co-defendants even if the operation of s.76(2) prevented its admission for the prosecution. In contrast, if Spencer's wider interpretation is adopted it would seem that even if the confession was admissible against its maker under s.76(1) it could still not be admissible against its maker's co-defendants as it would not be admissible against them under s. 76 (1) or s.76A(1).
A final question to which the authorities currently do not provide an answer is whether a nonhearsay confession made by a third party is admissible in criminal proceedings. As was seen above, none of ss. 76 
